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AE3STRACT
A two-country, intertemporal, perfect-foresight model with micro
foundations, Cobb-Douglas preferences and technologies, floating exchange
rates, uncovered interest parity, and nominal wage rigidities is formulated.
The transient and steady-state effects of a joint and unilateral monetary
disinflation and a fiscal expansion are analysed. The foreign repercussions
of monetary and fiscal policy do not affect the home economy, so that the
multipliers are the same as for a small open economy. Since Ricardian debt
neutrality holds, the nominal interest rate is equal to the rate of time
preference plus the discounted average of future, expected monetary growth
rates and is independent of fiscal policy and foreign policies. Also,
monetary disinflation does not lead to overshooting of the nominal exchange
rate. To give a non-trivial role to wealth effects, current-account dynamics
and the nominal exchange rate, and to allow for more interesting
international spill-over effects, the model is extended to allow for finite
lif'etimes so that Ricardian debt neutrality no longer holds. The transient
effects of tax-financed and debt-financed changes in monetary growth and
government spending are discussed.
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'1'he assumption of' risk-neutral arbitrage in efficient Foreign exchange
markets and infinitely flexible exchange rates is often combined with the
assumption of nominal wage rigidity, as incorporated in the expectations-
augwented Phillips curve, in modern open economy macroeconomics. Such
extended Mundell-Fleming models imply that a monetary disinFlation leads to
an immediate appreciation of the exchange rate which overshoots its
equilibrium value (Dornbusch, 1973). The cumulative output loss is
independent of' whether a gradualist or cold-turkey disinflation programme is
implemented, so that the same model can be used to analyse the effects of
successive reductions in monetary growth as was done in the Medium Term
Financial Strategy of the Thatcher regime (Buiter and Miller, 1982). A
fiscal expansion in such models of small open economies typically has no
real effects, because the real exchange rate immediately jumps to its long-
run value and the resulting contraction in net exports exactly off-sets the
increase in government spending. These models can be extended to allow for
wealth effects and current-account dynamics (along the lines of Dornbusch
and Fischer, 1980). In interdependent economies with highly integrated
financial markets and floating exchange rates, a monetary expansion is
typically a beggar-thy-neighbour policy as far as employment and output is
concerned. The reason is that the downward pressure on interest rates and
incipient capital outflows are choked off by a depreciatiun oF the real
exchange rate which reduces net exports of the foreign country. However, the
depreciation of the real exchange rate reduces real income at home and
increases real income abroad. On the other hand, a fiscal expansion is a
locomotive policy as far as employment and output is concerned because thez
incipient capital inflows arising from the upward pressure on the interest
rate lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Turnovsky (1986),
van der Ploeg (1986) and Branson (1988) discuss the own and spill-over
effects of unanticipated and anticipated changes in monetary and fiscal
policy. Two-country exchange-rate overshooting models have been extensively
used to analyse issues of international policy coordination (Miller and
Salmon, i985; Currie and Levine, 1985: Oudiz and Sachs, 1985). One finds
that non-cooperative monetary disinflation occurs excessively fast. The
reason is that individual governments ignore the adverse consequences on
foreign real income and thus attempt to export inflation and disinflate too
fast. It is also possible to show that international policy coordination may
be counter-productive, because it worsens the problem of maintaining
credibility with the private sectors (Rogoff, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1988a).
The reason is that, when governments do not cooperate, there is a
disincentive to renege and implement a surprise increase in monetary growth
as the resulting depreciation of the exchange rate leads to inflation costs.
Under international policy coordination there is no such disincentive to
renege and therefore governments end up with higher inflation and lower
welfare.
The literature discussed above addresses important and interesting
policy issues, but it suffers from the use of ad-hoc macroeconomic models.
The objective of this paper is to reconsider these policy issues within the
context of two-country models with micro foundations. The advantages of such
an approach are that the intertemporal budget constraints of the governments
and private sectors are modelled in a consistent manner, that wealth effects
and current-account dynamics are taken account of, that the welfare3
functions are directly related to the utility of the representative
consumer, and that the model is less susceptible to the Lucas (1976)
critique of econometric policy evaluation. Section 2 formulates a two-
country model with imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods,
perfect substitution between home and foreigr. government bonds, no currency
substitution, international labour immobility, Cobb-Douglas preferences and
technologies, and unemployment caused by nominal wage rigidities. There is
no capital formation in order to stay as close as possible to the literature
on two-country, real exchange-rate overshooting models (see Giovannini,
1988; Obstfeld. 1988; and van der Ploeg, 1988b for a discussion of capital
formation in a full-employment setting). Since households are assumed to
have infinite lifetimes, Ricardian debt neutrality ( e.g., Barro, 1974) holds
and therefore bond-finance and tax-finance are equivalent. It follows that
there is only a trivia] role foc current-account dynamics. In fact, the main
chafinel of international transmission familiar from ad-hoc Mundell-Fleming
model disappears as the nominal interest rate is independent of fiscal
policy and of changes in foreign policies. The nominal interest rate turns
out to be the sum of the pure rate of time preference and the average of
future, expected monetary growth rates. Section 3 decomposes the two-country
model into global averages and global differences, which permits a tractable
analy~;is, nncl Section tJ discussFS the stFady-state properH.es. One nf the
kry propcrLies of thc model is that Lhe lnrge-economy multipliers are the
same as ttie small-economy multipliers, since the repercussions of home
policy on the rest of the world do not affect the home economy. A related
property is that the real exchange rate adjusts to ensure that the balance
of trade is continuously in equilibrium. A similar result has been obtained
by Rankin ( 1987) in a two-period, two-country model. Section 5 argues that4
monetary disinflation no longer leads to overshooting of the nominal
exchange rate, despite the fact that adjustment in the labour markets is
sluggish. Monetary disinflation dces lead to transient job losses, but this
arises purely from the sluggishness of nominal wages. Section 6 considers a
joint and unilateral fiscal expansion. Section 7 extends the model to allow
for sluggish core inflation. Although there are now international spill-over
effects, the nominal interest rate is unaffected by fiscal policy and by
foreign policies. Also, subsequent to a monetary disinflation, the nominal
exchange rate does not overshoot but jumps straight to its new value. As far
as the cumulative deviations of output from its natural level are concerned,
a monetary disinflation has no spill-over effect whilst a fiscal expansion
has a beggar-thy-neighbour effect. Section 8 relaxes Ricardian debt
neutrality by allowing for finite lifetimes (Blanchard, 1985). This gives a
role for current-account dynamics and non-trivial international spill-over
effects of monetary policies, because the nominal interest rate and the
nominal exchange rate can now be affected by fiscal policies and by foreign
policies. Section 9 considers debt finance, which gives a non-trivial role
for fiscal policy as well. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. A two-countrv model with nominal wage rigidities
The world consists of two economies with identical preferences and
identical technologies. The foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
There is imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods and each
country is wholly specialised in the production of a single good. The asset
menu of consumers consists of home government bonds, foreign government5
bonds and home cash, so that there is no currency substitution. However,
there is perfect substitution between home and foreign government bonds.
Risk-neutral arbitrage then implies that uncovered interest parity holds.
There is a regime of floating exchange rates. The demand side of each
economy consists of a representative household with an inelastic supply of
Icibour, Cobb-Douglas preferences over home goods, foreign goods and real
money balances, and a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The
resulting consumption functions are linear in human plus non-human wealth.
The supply of goods in each economy comes from a neoclassical labour demand
schedule and production function. There is no labour mobility between the
two countries. Wage formation in each country is determined by an augmented
Phillips curve, which incorporates the assumption of nominal wage rigidity.
The government services its debt, spends on home goods, levies lump-sum
taxes and finances the resulting deficit by printing money or by borrowing
from the private sector. In fact, it will be assumed that taxes adjust to
balance the government's budget continuously and thus to maintain a constant
stock of' real government debt. Hence, the government's two exogenous policy
instruments are nominal money growth and government spending. Changes in
non-human wealth therefore equal changes in real money balances plus changes
in net foreign assets, where the latter changes follow from the current-
account dynamics. Ricardian debt neutrality (e.g., Barro, 1974) ensures that
this assumption about tax adjustment is not very restrictive, because eny
increase in government bonds and non-human wealth is exactly off-set by a
decrease in human wealth as any increase in borrowing must eventually be
paid for by increases in future taxes. There is perfect foresight.6
The representative household maximises at instant t its utility
function,
u(t) , oJ~ exp[-p(s-t)] C~llog(Cd(s)) t~21og(cm(s1) t~r31og(M(s))J ds.
Y1, Y2, Y3 Z o. yl . Y2 ~~3 - 1
subject to the household's budget constraint,
(2.1)
dN(s)~ds - r(s)N(s) ~ W(s)L(s) - T(s) - Cd(s) - E(s)Cm(s) - i(s)M(s)
(2.2)
where p denotes the subjective rate of time preference, and U(t), Cd(t),
Cm(t), M(t), N(t), T(t), L(t), W(t), r(t), i(t) and E(t) denote utility,
consumption of home goods, consumption of foreign goods, holdings of real
money balances, non-human wealth, lump-sum taxes, employment, the real wage,
the real interest rate, the nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate
(the price of foreign goods in terms of home goods) at time t, respectively.
The real interest rate at time t is defined as r(t)~i(t)-p(t) where p(t)
denotes the rate of inflation at time t. Feenstra (1985) provides a
justification, based on liquidity costs, for entering money in the utility
function. If one defines total consumption (including the interest foregone
on money holdings) at time t as
C(t) ~ Cd(t) ~ E(t)Cm(t) t i(t)M(t), (2'3)~
one obtains the first-order conditions, Cd(t)-y1C(t), Cm(t)-Y2C(t)~E(t),
M{t)-y3C(t)~i(t) and the tilt of the total consumption function,
dC(t)~dt-[r(t)-p]C(t). These follow from the fact that the marginal rate of
substitution between home and foreign goods must equal the real exchenge
rate and between home goods and real money balances must equal the
opportunity cost of holding real money balances, i.e., the nominal interest
rate. The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences implies a unit elasticity
of imports with respect to the relative price of foreign goods and a unit
elasticity of money with respect to the nominal interest rate. The tilt says
that consumption increases (decreases) over time, i. e., households save
relatively more in the early parts of their life. if the real interest rate
exceeds ( is less than) the subjective rate of time preference. Total
consumption at time t can be written as a linear function of total wealth,
C(t)-p[N(t)tH(t)] where human wealth is the discounted value of the stream
of present and future after-tax wage income,
H(t) E tJm exP[-tJsr(s')ds'] [W(s)L(s) - T(s)] ds. (2.4)
and non-human wealth is the sum of bond holdings, B(t), money holdings,
M(t), and a fixed stock of capital or land, say K~-1.
There is no lag between production, sales and income. Firms produce at
home under perfect competition and subject to a Cobb-Douglas production
function, say Y-f(L,KC)-L~, O(p(1 where Y denotes output. Because the
marginal productivity of labour diminishes, both employment and aggregate
supply are decreasing functions of the real producers' wage, L-L(W)~
{S,W) 1~{1-g) ~d y-y(W).(~~W)p~(1-p). The other factors of production,8
i.e., capital or land, are fixed and are paid their marginal products, so
that profits are zero. Nominal wages are rigid and are above the market-
clearing level in the short run, so that households are rationed in their
supply of labour and there is unemployment. Hence, effective labour supply
is given by labour demand and this is what determines income, human wealth
and consumption. Nominal wage rigidity is captured by the augmented Phillips
curve,
u(t) f P(t) - a log[L(t)~(1-un)] ' rt(t), oc ) 0, (2.5)
where un denotes the natural rate of unemployment, ~(t)~[dW(t)~dt]~W(t)
denotes the rate of growth in the real wage, and rt(t) denotes the rate of
core (or trend) inflation. Hence, nominal wage inflation decreases with the
unemployment rate and increases one-for-one with core inflation. Core
inflation is given by monetary growth, R(t)-g(t) where g(t) denotes the
growth rate in the nominal supply of outside money. Alternatively, core
inflation gradually catches up with inflation in the CPI, p, that is c
dR(t)Idt - u LP~(t) - rr(t)]. u) O. (2.6)
If the opportunity costs of holding real money balances are ignored,
inflation of the ideal cost-of-living index or CPI can be written as a
weighted average of inflation of home and foreign prices:
pc(t) - p(t) ~ ~Z(dE(t)~dt)~E(t) t ~r3(di(t)~dt)i(t)
- p(t) t y(dE(t)~dt)~E(t) (2.~)9
where the value-share of imports in final expenditures is approximately
equal to the parameter y.
The government's budget constraint can be written as
dD(t)~dt - r(t)D(t) a G(t) - T(t) - y(t)M(t), D(G)-D~, (2.ó)
where D(t) and G(t) denote real government debt issued to home and foreign
households and real government spending on home goods at time t,
respectively. Integration of (2.8) and solvency of the government's finances
gives
D(t) ' tf" exp[-tJsr(s')ds'] [T(s) ~ S(s)M(s) - G(s)] ds. (Z-9)
so that the current government debt plus the discounted stream of present
and future levels of government spending has to be paid off by the
discounted stream of present and future lump-sum taxes plus seigniorage
revenues. Since debt neutrality prevails, we may as well assume that lump-
sum taxes adjust to maintain a constant stock of government debt. T-rDtG-8M,
and D(t)-DG for all t Z 0. Hence, the two exogenous policy instruments are g
and G.
Equilibrium in the money market is given by
dM(t)~dt - [g(t) - p(t)] M(t), í2.9')lo
where the initial price level and holdings of real money balances are
unconstrained by their past histories as they depend on expectations of
future events. Equilibrium in the home goods market at time t is given by
Y(t) - Cd(t) t G(t) ~ Cm(t), (2.10)
where Cm(t) denotes exports of the home country to the foreign country at
time t. Net holdings of foreign assets, F, are the excess of households'
holdings of bonds over government debt, that is F~B-D. Equilibrium in the
world market for government bonds requires B4E6` - DtED`. Interest payments
on net foreign assets plus the balance of trade gives the current account,
which equals the increase in the nation's wealth:
dF(t)~dt - r(t)F(t) 4 Cm(t) - E(t)Cm(t), F(0)-0. (2.11)
Integration of (2.11) and the country's solvency condition gives
-F(t) - tfin exp[-tfsr(s')ds'] [CID(s) - E(s)Cm(s)] ds, (2.11')
which says that the nation's current debt has to be paid off by future
savings surpluses of the government and private sector. Fínally, risk-
neutral arbitrage between home and foreign government bonds gives uncovered
interest parity,
r(t) - r`(t) t [(dE(t)~dt)~E(t)],
which was already assumed in equations ( 2.2) and (2.11).
(2.12)11
The complete two-country model also includes foreign analogves of the
relationships discussed for the home country above where E"-1IE and F'z-FIE.
3. Global averages and differences: A linear state-space representation
Log-linearisation of the home part of the model yields cd-c, cIDc-e, i
- y3CIM - n( c-m). n~pt9(m). .~--wI(1-p). Y--w~3I(1-p). r-r".(deldt).
Pc-P'y(deldt),
y--g~w - glc t ~Zg t~3(c"te) -( 1-~Z)c 4~Zg. H''sI(1-,s) ~ o.
~1, g2, ~3 z o. ~1 { ~2 ` ~3 - 1.
m- 8 - P- 8 t r- n(c-m).
w-or.l~ n-P--a~wirt. r-~(c-m). a'~acl(1-g))G.





c - c" - (r-p) - (r"-p) - é (3.5)
and
U - pU - ylc - ~r2(c-e) - y3m - pU - ylc - ~r2c" - ~3m. (3.6)12
where small letters (except for i, r, W, p, pc, rt and g) denote logarithmic
deviations from the equilibrium values (e.g., c(t)~log[C(t)~C(m)]),
~1~Cd(m)~Y(m), ~2~G(m)~Y(m) and g3~Cm(m)~Y(m). Note that the expression for
the nominal interest rate is the only one that needed to be linearised.
Equation (3.5) gives the real exchange rate as the ratio of home consumption
to foreign consumption, e- c-c~. Hence, when the home country consumes
faster than the foreign country and therefore when home households save
relatively more in the early part of their life than foreign households,
there must bo a renl-interest-rate differential in favour of the home
country and consequently the real exchange rate is expected to and must
depreciate. It follows that the balance of trade is continuously in balance,
Cm(t)-E(t)Cm(t)-0 for all tZO, and there is therefore no current-account
dynamics. This follows from both the home and foreign government's budget
being continuously in balance (e.g, Buiter, 1987), from the Ricardian debt
neutralíty proposition (see Section 8 for an extension) and from both
countries having the same rate of time preference.
Combination of equations (3.2) and (3.5) and forward integration yields
an interesting expression for the nominal interest rate:
i(t) - P t tfm ge(s.t) n exp[-~ ( s-t)]as (3.7)
where ge(s,t) denotes the expectation of g(s) formed at time tss. Hence, the
nominal interest rate at any given point of time equals the long-run real
interest rate (equal to the pure rate of time preference) Plus a weighted
average of all future, expected monetary growth rates. In particular, the
nominal interest rate does not depend on fiscal policy and does not depend13
on foreign policies. If there is an unanticipated, permanent change in
monetary growth of eg at time t, then the nominal interest rate immediately
jumps to its new equilibrium value ei(s) - e8, s2t.
Since the two-country model is symmetric, it is possible to decouple
the dynamics into two independent sub-systems for the global averages and
global differences, respectively (Aoki, 1981). Global averages are denoted
by a superscript a(e.g., ma~}(mtm~)) and global differences are denoted by
a superscript d(e.g., m~m-mw). The predetermined state variable will be
x~m-w whilst the non-predetermined state variable(s) will be m(and rt).
After some algebraic manipulation, the sub-system of global averages can be
written as:
Xa - a'(ma-xa) - rta 4 8a. xa(o)-o (3.8)




- -uCW(ma-xa) ` n~yma ' Sq(Ra`P) ' R~SBaI. erta(o) - -uema(0) (3.10)
or rta-8a. where w~(1-g4)(a'.n) ~ 0. OCg4.(1-g2)~ll-g2`p')~1. g5'~2~
(1-~2~p')~0 and ca-[g'(xa-ma)-~2ga]~(1-~2). Similarly, the sub-system of
global differences can be written as:
Xd - oe'(m-xd) - rtd ' 8d. xd(0)-0
m- W(md-xd) ' n~4m -(1-~4)rtd ~ 8d ' Il~Sgd.
(3.11)
(3.12)14
nd --u{v(m-xd) ' ngym 4 g4nd f~g5gd ' g6[W-~')(md-xd)
t~g4m t g4nd 4 ~g5gd]}. ~nd(0) --u[nmd(0)-2 yee(0)] (3.13)
or Rd-gd, where g6~2~~'~(1-g2))0 and e-cd-[~'(xd-m )-g2gd]~(1-g2). The home
and foreign counterparts follow immediately from the global averages snd
global differences; e.g., m-mt}m and m'-m-}m.
Consider first the case where core inflation equals monetary growth in
both countries (rt-9. n`-3M). The two sub-systems for the global avereges and
global differences are then completely identical. In fact, analogous sub-
systems hold for the home and Foreign economy. For this case each country is
thus completely insulated from the rest of the world, so that neither
monetary nor fiscal policy has any international spill-over effects on
output or employment (see Sections 5 and 6). This is a direct consequence of
the nominal interest rate being independent of foreign policies (see
equation (3.7)), because in the ad-hoc, two-country Mundell-Fleming models
familiar from the textbooks the main transmission channel is through the
nominal interest rate. It follows that the impact, interim and final
multipliers of economic policy are the same for a large open economy as for
a small open economy. This is in sharp contrast to ad-hoc two-country models
with nominal wage rigidities (e.g., Turnovsky, 1986; van der Ploeg, 1986;
Branson, 1988). Rankin (198~) obtains a similar result for a two-period,
two-country, Mundell-Fleming model with micro foundations, Cobb-Douglas
preferences and Ricardian debt neutrality. However, the real exchange rate
and therefore foreign real income and foreign inflation can be affected by a
change in home policy. It follows that the only channel of international15
interdependence is through the real exchange rate and thus the CPI, so that
each country has an incentive to export CPI-inflation by appreciating its
currency.
The determinant of the Jacobian of each sub-system, -~'nS4. is
negative, so that there is one stable root corresponding to the
predetermined variable x or x and one unstable root corresponding to the
.
non-predetermined variable m or m . Hence, this perfect-foresight system
satisfies the saddlepoint property (e.g, Buiter, 1984). This property is
reflected in the phase diagram for the home economy (see Fig. 1). Below the
450 or dx~dt-0 locus the real wage is excessively low, so that employment
and output are above their natural rates, the nominal wage is rising faster
than monetary growth and real liquidity, x, is falling. The dm~dt-0 locus is
flatter than the 450 line, that is it has a slope
~'~[(1-g2)(~~(a'tn))'~'~ ~ 1. Below the dm~dt-0 locus prices are rising
faster than monetary growth and real money balances, m, are falling. Along
the stable arm, SS, the nominal interest rate is constant and thus m-c is
constant, so that SS lies on
m-m(m) - (1-~, [x-x(~)~ ~ x-x(~)
(3.14)
and thus along SS m increases more slowly than x and thus real wages fall
along SS. It also follows that the stable arm, SS, is flatter than the two
loci. The phase diagram for the foreign economy (and for the global averages
or global differences) is exactly the same.16
Next consider the case where core inflation gradually responds to
changes in inflation in the CPI. The sub-system of global averages now
differs from the sub-system of global differences and therefore there are
international spill-over effects on output and employment as well. The
saddlepoint property requires each sub-system to have two stable eigenvalues
associated with the backward-looking variables xa and rta (or xd and nd) and
one stable eigenvalue associated with the forward-looking variable ma (or
m). Core inflation is backward-looking but non-predetermined, because nn(0)
--u[pm(0) -~ee(0)] (see Section ~). The transient properties of these
three-dimensional sub-systems will be analysed in Section 7 with the aid of
numerical simulation.
4. Steady-state properties
In the long run the real wage, employment and output are at their
natural rates, w(m)-~(m)-y(~)-w~(m)-j;w(m)-y'(m)-0, and inflation is entirely
delermined by monetary growth. P(m)-PC(m)'n(~)'8(m) and PM(m)zPé(m)'
R'(m)-g~(m). The world real interest rate is in the long run given by the
subjective rate of time preference, r(m)-rM(m)-p, and nominal interest rates
are given by i(m)-ptg(m) and iM(m)-p.gM(m). It follows that in the long run
the inflation diFferential equals the rate of depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate, so that relative purchasing power parity holds in the long
run. The steady-state levels of consumption and the real exchange rate
follow from the conditions for equilibrium in the home and foreign goods
markets, that is c(m)-cd(m)-cm(m)--~Zg(m)~(1-g2), and e(m)- ~2[g'(m)-
g(m)]~(1-~z). An increase in government spending leads to an excess demand17
for goods, which eventually is choked off by an appreciation of the real
exchange rate. The resulting reductions in consumption and exports
completely crowd out the increase in government spending, so that fiscal
policy is neutral in the long run. The drop in total consumption also leads
to a fall in real money balances. An increase in monetary growth leads to an
equal increase in the nominal interest rate and a fall in the demand for
real money balances and non-human wealth, m(m)-x(m)-n(m)--[(P}g(m))~n]-
[~2~(1-g2)]g(m). If x denotes the ratio of non-human wealth to human wealth,
then the change in long-run human wealth is given by
h(m)--[p~z~(1-~z)]g(m);[(ptg(m))x~n]. An increase in government spending
leads to a fall in real money balances and seigniorage revenues, so that
taxes have to increase by more than the increase in government spending and
human wealth falls. An increase in monetary growth leads to an increase in
seigniorage revenues, so that taxes fall and human wealth increases.
Finally, asymptotic utility of the representative household is given by
u - - [~Z~(1-~2)P][(1-~Z)s(m) t ~r2g"(m)] - (x3IPn)CP-8(m)]. (4.i)
An increase in home government spending reduces welfare, because 1t crowds
out private consumption and holdings of real money balances. However, if
government spending is not of the hole-in-the-ground variety and instead
yields direct utility, an increase in home government spending may increase
welfare despite the crowding out. An increase in foreign government spending
induces an increase in the relative price of foreign goods, i.e., a
depreciation of the home real exchange rate, and thus a fall in home
consumption of foreign goods, which reduces home welfare. This is the only
form of persistent externality between the two countries and shows that, as18
far as welfare is concerned, a fiscel expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy. It follows that, in the absence of international policy
coordination, the fiscal stance of each country is too loose as the adverse
consequences on the other country are ignored (van der Ploeg, 1987). An
increase in monetary growth has no international spill-over effects in the
long run, because there is an equal increase in the rate of depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate. However, the increase in the opportunity cost of
holding money balances reduces money balances and welfare. The full
liquidity rule drives the nominal interest rate to zero, í.e., g--p, and
maximises asymptotic welfare. international spill-over effects do arise when
there is capital accumulatlon, because then an increase in monetary growth
reduces the world real interest rate and increase capital and output at home
and abroad (see van der Ploeg, 1988b).
5. Monetary disinflation
Hoth countries are iiiitially in long-run equilibrium with positive
rates of inflation (y-g'~0). Consider the situation where both countries
simultaneously engage in a previously unanticipated, permanent disinflation
by reducing their monetary growth rates to zero (8-g~-0). In the long run
world inflation drops to zero, nominal interest rates fall and holdings of
real money balances increase. In fact, equation (3.7) shows that the nominal
interest rates aL home and abroad immediately jump down to their new
equilibrium values. Since this is a global monetary disinflation, there are
no transient or long-run effects on the nominal and real exchange rates or19
on the current account. Here, as in Section 6, it is assumed that core
inflation equals monetary growth (R-R`-0).
The expected excess supply of goods induced by the global monetary
contraction leads to an immediate fall in prices and the instantaneous fall
in nominal interest rates lead to an immediate increase in holdings of real
money balances (a jump from E to A on SS in Fig. 1). Since nominal wages are
rigid, the real wage rises on impact and therefore world output and
employment fall on ímpact. Afterwards, the transient increase in
unemployment reduces the nominal wage and real wage until output and
employment have increased back to their natural rates again (movement from A
to E' along SS). The expected Fall in seigniorage revenues implies an
expected increase in taxes. This, together with the rise in the real
interest rate, implies a fall in human wealth. This fall in human wealth
dominates the increase in non-human wealth, so that consumption and
aggregate demand fall on impact. Subsequently, the gradusl rise in real
money balances and non-human wealth ensures that consumption recovers to its
old equilibrium level. The world interest rate temporarily rises, which
corresponds to a short-run Mundell effect. Welfare increases in the long
run, but in the short run the fall in consumption may temporarily reduce
welfare.
Now consider the situation where the foreign country initially has no
inflation (g~-0) and the home country has a positive rate of inflation
(g)0). This implies that the rate of depreciation of the home country's
nominal exchange rate initially equals the home monetary growth rate. The
home country then disinflates by bringing down its monetary growth to zero20
(g-0). In the long run its inflation rate falls to zero, its nominal
interest rate falls to the foreign country's interest rate, its holdings of
real money balances increases to the foreign level, and its nominal exchange
rate is stable. In fact, it follows from (3.7) that the nominal interest
rate falls immediately on impact to its new equilibrium value. The phase
diagram is already presented in Fig. 1(path EAE'). There are no
international spill-over effects apart from the externality on foreign
consumption of home goods, so that each economy is insu]ated from the rest
of the world even though there is nominal wage rigidity and unemployment.
This is in sharp contrast to the conclusions derived from extended, two-
country Mundell-Fleming models. Since during the transient period there is a
real-interest-rate differential in favour of the home country, the home
country's real exchange rate is expected to depreciate during the adjustment
period and therefore appreciates on impact. The resulting fall in home
exports (cID-c'te-c) exactly matches the fall in the value of home imports
(etcm-c), so that the balance of trade is continuously in equilibrium. It
follows that, as far as welfare is concerned, monetary disinflation is a
beggar-thy-neighboi,r policy ir, the short run as foreign consumption of home
goods temporarily falls. Since on impact the real exchange rate appreciates
(i.e., the home price level rises), the foreign consumers' price index
temporarily rises and then falls back to its original level. However, as far
as output and employment is concerned, there are no international spill-over
effects. On impact the nominal interest rate falls end chokes off the excess
supply of money, which is induced by the fall in the price level and the
resulting boost in the real supply of money and by the fall in consumption
and demand for real money balances. Since the nominal interest rate
immediately jumps down and removes the differential with the foreign nominalzl
interest rate, the nominal exchange rate appreciates on impact exactly to
the new equilibrium value and is therefore neither expected to depreciate,
nor to appreciate during the adjustment period. Hence, the familiar result
of monetary disinflation causing overshooting of the nominal exchange rate
(Dornbusch, 19~6; Buiter and Miller, 1982; Turnovsky, 1986; van der Ploeg,
1986) does not hold in this model with micro foundations and Ricardian debt
neutrality.
It is easy to show that when nominal wages are flexible and immedíately
clear the labour market (a'-~). all variables jump instantaneously to their
new equilibrium values.
Before the effects of a fiscal expansion are discussed, it is
worthwhile to briefly discuss the effects of an anticipated monetary
disinflation at home (path EAlA2E' in Fig. 1). From equation (3.~) it is
clear that the nominal interest falls on impact and continues to fall until
the cut in monetary growth is implemented. Since there are no spill-over
effects on the foreign nominal interest rate (nor for that matter on any
other foreign variable, except for an increase in foreign consumers' prices
and a fall in foreign imports in the transient period), there is during the
announcement period a nominal interest-rate-differential in favour of the
home country and thus the nominal exchange rate is expected to appreciate
during this period. Before the cut in monetary growth is implemented, prices
fall on impact and continue to fall afterwards. Hence, real money balances
rise over the announcement period. Since real wages already rise during the
adjustment period, the economy suffers from a recession before the cut in
monetary growth is even implemented.zz
6. Fiscal expansion
Initially both economies are in long-run equilibrium (g-g'-g-g'-0).
Both governments then simultaneously engage in an unanticipated, permanent
fiscal expansion (g-g')0). The transient effects are summarised by the path
E'BE in Fig. 1. Obviously, there are no effects on the exchange rate or
current account. On impact the price levels rise, which erodes the real
value of the rigíd nominal wage and boosts aggregate employment and output
in both countries. On impact the increase in government spending raises
aggregate demand, but there is some crowding out of private consumption as
the erosion of real money balances reduces non-human wealth and the fall in
real wages and increase in taxation causes a fall in human wealth.
Subsequently, the boom raises nominal wages faster than prices so that real
wages rise and employment and aggregate supply fall back to their natural
rates. Aggregate demand also falls, because both non-human and human wealth
continue to fall during the adjustment period. The world real interest rate
falls on impact and subsequently recovers to the pure rate of time
preference. This is consistent with falling consumpti.on levels. Nominal
interest rates are unaffected.
Now consider the case where the home goverment implements an
unanticipated, permanent fiscal expansion (see Fig. 3). The story is almost
the same as for the multilateral fiscal expansion, because the exchange rate
insulates the home country from feedback of foreign repercussions. The real
exchange rate appreciates on impact and undershoots its new equilibrium
value, because the real-interest-rate differential is in favour of the
foreign country and therefore the private sector expects the real exchange
rate to appreciate during the adjustment period. The nominal exchange rate23
is unaffected (see equation (3.~)), so that the appreciation of the real
exchange rate arises entirely from increases in the home price level. The
resulting fall in the real value of consumption of home goods plus foreign
goods exactly equals the fall in consumption under a multilateral fiscal
expansion. The increase in the relative price of home goods means that the
foreign country's consumption of home good falls, so that foreign welfare
falls. Hence, as far as welfare is concerned, a fiscal expansion is a
beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Foreign producers' prices are unaffected, but
foreign consumers' prices increase on impact and subsequently continue to
rise to the new equilibrium level. Foreign interest rates and the home
nominal interest rate are unaffected, but there is (as with the joint fiscal
expansion) a temporary fall in the home real interest rate.
~. Sluggish core inflation
Sections 5 and 6 assumed that core inflation was given by monetary
growth, but here it- is assumed that cvre inflation is given by a weighted
average of past inFlation rates in the consumers' price index. The nominal
interest rate and nominal exchange rate will display the same behaviour as
in Sections 5 and 6, but there will be some international spill-over effects
through the real exchange rate affecting foreign consumers' prices, foreign
wages and thus foreign employment and output. The numerical simulations
presented in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate these differences. As far as monetary
disinflation is concerned, there is still no overshooting of the nominal
exchange rate. The jump appreciation of the real exchange rate leads on
impact to an immediate fall in core inflation at home and increase in core24
inflation abroad. The downward jump in the price level on impact reinforces
the downward jump in core inflation on impact. In fact, core inflation
overshoots its new value on impact. Subsequently, nominal wage inflation
falls as core inflation falls and this is the reason that home employment
and output quickly recover and the home economy even becomes overheated. The
result is that the real exchange rate recovers and eventually depreciates.
Foreign nominal wages increase in the beginning, leading to unemployment,
but after the real exchange rate has depreciated foreign nominal wages can
fall, leading to over-employment. There is a cyclical adjustment towards the
new equilibrium.
As far as a fiscal expansion is concerned, there is an appreciation of
the real exchange rate and an increase in the home price level on impact
leading, on balance, to an increase in core inflation both at home and
abroad. On impact the erosion of the real wage, due to the increase in the
price level, boosts home employment and output. This process continues
afterwards. The eventual rise in foreign wages arising from the increase in
foreign core inflation leads to falls in foreign employment and output. The
nominal exchange rate is unaffected by the fiscal expansion at home.
The cumulative output gain is easily shown to be given by (cf., Buiter
and Miller, 1982):
oJW y(t) dt - C~sl(au)] ~ (s~l~) [~2l(1-~2)] (eg-eg") (7.1)
which follows from -oJWw(t)dt-[rt(t)N-lfw(t)-~e(t)]óla'. Note that the
cumulative output loss is independent of the policy paths pursued, so that
it does not matter whether a gradualist or cold-turkey policy is adopted.
The cumulative percentage output loss arising from a monetary disinflation25
of one percentage point is called the sacrifice ratio, ~~(aH). Tha sacrifice
ratio increases when labour markets are less flexible (small a) and when
core inflation adapts sluggishly to changes in the cost of living (small x).
The cumulative output gain arising from a fiscal expansion increases when
the share of government in total output (q2) is large, when labour markets
are less flexible and when the share of imports (~) is large, because under
these conditions the resulting appreciation of the real exchange rate is
large and the effect on output, through the wedge between producers' and
consumers' prices, is large.
8. Finite lives and current-account dynamics
So far, the analysis focussed on the transient effects of monetary
disinflation and fiscal expansion. The current account was irrelevant,
because the model satisfied the Ricardian debt neutrality proposition (see
Barro, 19~4) and therefore government debt and net foreign assets did not
affect consumption. ar~d aggregate demand. A corollary of Y.his set-up was that
the real exchange rate always adjusted to keep the balance of trade and
current account continuously in balance, so that there was no feedback from
foreign repercussions due to changes in home policy on the home economy.
Hence, the large-economy multipliers are exactly the same as the small-
economy multipliers. Obviously, these are not realistic features of a model
that attempts to describe the real world. It is, of course, the case that,
if core inflation is given by a weighted average of past inflation rates in
the consumers' price index rather than given by monetary growth, there are26
international spill-over effects on employment and output and the large-
economy multipliers will differ from the small-economy multipliers (see
Section 7), but there will still be no explicit role for the dynamics of the
government budget constraint and the current account. Also, the nominal
exchange rate and interest rate will still be unaffected by fiscal policies.
This Section therefore relaxes the assumption of Ricardian debt equivalence
and thereby allows the current account to play a non-trivial role. This is
achieved when one assumes capital market imperfections, distortionary taxes,
or lack of an intergenerational bequest motive combined with either finite
lives (Blanchard, 1985) or population growth (Weil, 1986). The extension of
the model that follows adopts the assumption of finite lives.
It is assumed that each economy is made up of identical consumers with
constant life expectancy, l~b, and no íntergenerational bequest motive.
Consumers maximise expected utility, which means that they maximise utility
using the discount rate ptb instead of p where bZ0 denotes the instantaneous
probability of death. The individual consumer receives (pays) at every
period of his life a premium at the rate b and at the time of death the
individual's net wealth (debt) goes to (is cancelled by) the life insurance
companies. This premium is actuarially fair, so that the life insurance
market is efficient. At each instant t a cohort of size b is born. Since b
is also the probability of death, the size at instant t of a cohort born at
instant s5t equals bexp[-b(s-t)] and the population at instant t therefore
equals tJOs exp[-b(s-t)]ds-1. Population aggregates are then obtained as the
sum of the products of the consumption of each surviving cohort with its
size. This results in the aggregate consumption function
C(t)-(p~b)[N(t)tH(t)], where human wealth is now given byz7
H(t) o tf~ exp[-tfs(r(s')'b)ds'][W(s)b(s) - T(s)]ds. (8.1)
Human wealth is the discounted stream of after-tax wage income, where the
discount rate is augmented with the probability of death in order to allow
for the fact that individuals only expect to earn income when they are
alive. The return on aggregate non-human wealth does not contain a life
insucance premium, because such a premium constitutes a transfer from those
who die to those who survive. Substitution of these results into (2.2) and
(2.3) gives
dC(t)~dt -[r(t) - p] C(t) - b(b~p) N(t). (8.2)
This shows that government bonds, and in particular net foreign assets,
affect aggregate consumption behaviour, so that the current account need no
longer be in continuous balance. The assumption of finite lives drives a
wedge between the discount rate to calculate human wealth, r(t)4b, and the
discount rate used to calculate government debt, net foreign assets and non-
huma:. weaith, r(t). This wedge allows the b~rden of higher taxation to be
passed on to future, yet unborn generations, so that the Ricardian debt
neutrality proposition no longer holds and therefore the current account
plays a non-trivial role.
The linearised version of the resulting two-country model with finite
lives and gradual adaptation of core inflation to increases in the cost-of-
living can be summarised by:
a'(x-m) - ~lc ~ ~zg t g3(c'te). (8.3)28
s'(x"-m') - ~lc" ' ~2g" ' ~3(c-e).
f- p'f t y2(c"te-c). f(0)-C,
x- g- n- a'(x-m), x(0)-0,





rt- uLn(c-m) - r i~ é- rt~, en(0)'-uL~(0)-~ee(0)~. (8.8)
R" - uLn(c"-m") - r f(1-~) e- n"]. nn"(0)--uLnm"(0)t~oe(0)), (8.9)
m - r ' 8 - ~ (c-m). (8.10)
mM - r- é t 9" - n(c"-m"). (8.11)
è- r- p- b(b;p) C(~3~~)(m-c) ~ f7. (8.12)
and
c' - r - é - p - b ( btp) [(~3~n)(m"-~.) - f], (8.13)
where p'~r(m) and f;F~C. The ratio of net foreign assets to home
consumption, f, and real liquidity at hoo~e, x, and abroad, x", are backward-
looking, predetermined variables, whilst real money balances at home, m, and
abroad, m", consumption at home, c, and abroad, c", and the real exchange29
rate, e, are forward-looking, jump variables. Core inflation at home, n, and
abroad, rt". are backward-looking variables, even though the initial jumps in
the price levels and the real exchange rate imply initial jumps in core
inflation (cf., Buiter and Miller, 1982).
As before, the long-run levels of the real wage, output and employment
are at their natural rates and long-run inflation is given by monetary
growth. Steady-state asset market equilibrium follows from ( 8.10)-(8.13) and
yields:
f(m) - }(~3In2) (9-9")
(8.14)
r(m) ' CP - }b' (8'8")JI(1'b')
(8.15)
i(m) - CP ' 8 , }b' (8-8')7~(1'b')
(8.16)
where b'ob(b`p)~3In2. Steady-state equilibrium in the goods markets and
current account follows from (8.3)-(8.5) and (8.14) ai~d yields:
e(m) - -C521(1-~Z)J(s-s") - }(P'~n2)(y31~2)C(~1-~3)I(1-g2)] (g -9").
(8.17)
cd19) - c(m) - -C~2~(1-~2)J g ~ }(p'~n2)(X3Ió2)C~3~(1-~2)J (8-8") (8.18)
cm(~) - -C~2~(1-g2)] g" . }(P~~n2)(~31~2)[~1~(1-~2)] (8-s") (8.19)
ana30
x(m) - mÍm) - c(m) - (i(~)~n).
An increase in home monetary growth increases the long-run opportunity
cost of holding real money balances, i(m), and reduces the long-run real
interest rate. This is the Mundell effect. As a result private sector agents
switch out of money into bonds, so that the long-run holdings of net foreign
assets increase. This is associated with a trade deficit, because the
interest payments on net foreign assets held by home agents allow home
individuals to consume more and foreign individuals to consume less. The
reduction in net exports is induced by an appreciation of the real exchange
rate, when the value-share of imports in total expenditures does not exceed
50 percent (~(~ or ~1~~3), and by a depreciation of the real exchange rate,
when the share of imports exceeds 50 percent. The increase in seigniorage
revenues permits a cut in taxation, which combined with the fall in the real
interest rate raises long-run home human wealth. This, combined with the
increase in bond holdings, ensures that total wealth and consumption at home
increase in the long run despite a possible fall in real money balences. A
global increase in monetary growth leaves net foreign a~sets, exchange
rates, consumption, exports and imports unaffected in the long run. It
simply leads to a fall in the world real interest rate, an increase in
nominal interest rates and a fall in real money balances. Hence, asymptotic
welfare falls in both countries.
A tax-financed increase in home government spending leads to no changes
in net foreign assets or interest rates. It leads to an increase in the home
price level and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which induce a
fall in home consumption and exports. There is complete crowding out. The31
steady-state effects are exactly as discussed in Sections 4 and ~. In fact,
the transient effects of a tax-financed change in government spending are
also as discussed in Sections 4 and 7. The reason is that taxes vary to keep
government deht consttmt. The cumulative output gain is given by (cf.,
expression (7.1)):
oj"Y(t)dt - LR~I(ax)] ' (Ryla) [~2I11-~2)] (ng - ng") 4
}(Rála)(p'In2)(y31ë2)[(~1-~3)I(1-~2)] (n3-e9'). (8.20)
As far as the cumulative deviation of foreign output from its natural
level is concerned, it is clear that under infinite lives a monetary
disinflation has no spill-over effect whilst under finite lives and a
domestic bias in consumption (~C}) it has a small positive spill-over
effect, due to the appreciation of the long-run real exchange rate of the
foreign country. This means that a monetary expansion is, as in the Mundell-
Fleming analysis, a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. However, in contrast to the
shurt-run Dlundell-Fleming analysis, a fiscal expansion is also a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy as far as the cumulative output loss is concerned. In
addition, the effects of a fiscal expansion do not depend on whether
lifetimes are finite or infinite. As before the cumulative output loss
increases when labour markets are less flexible and core inflation behaves
in a more sluggish manner for a disinflation and when the shares of imports
and of government are large for a cut in government spending.
Table 1 also presents the effects of a monetary disinflation when there
is a life expectancy of 50. In contrast to the special case of infinite3z
lives, the nominal exchange rate overshoots its new equilibrium value. The
explanation is, however, very different from the one offered by the two-
country extensions of Dornbusch's ( 1976) model. The initial appreciation of
the real exchange rate outweighs the "income" effects and thus causes
transíent balance-of-trade deficits and an accumulation of foreign debt.
Hence, in the long run the real exchange rate has to depreciate in order to
generate a balance-of-trade surplus sufficiently large to finance the
interest on foreign debt. The long-run fall in foreign assets causes a fall
in home consumption and a corresponding increase in foreign consumption.
This means that the home price level has to fall less than under finite
lives and that the foreign price level has to fall in the long run. This
combined with the long-run depreciation of the real exchange rate implies
that the nominal exchange rate overshoots its new equilibrium value. In
contrast to the case of infinite lives, there is a lasting Mundell effect.
The transient effects of a change in government spending are also
independent of whether expected lifetimes are finite or infinite (see Table
2), but this only holds for the case of a constant government debt (tax
finance) as will be discussed in the next Section.
9. Government debt and current-account dynamics
So far, taxes adjust to have a zero public sector borrowing
requirement. It may be more reasonable to assume that the government deficit
is financed by borrowing. In order to ensure solvency of the government's
finances, it is assumed that taxes are increased when the government debt
increases:33
T(t) ' To(t) - v D(t), v~r (9.1)
where T denotes autonomous taxes and v denotes the reaction coefficient. It
0
follows from (2.8) that
d - (r-v)d t (~2~~1)(B-c) - (X3~n)s. d(C) - do (9.2)
and that (8.12) and (8.13) are replaced by
~ - r-p-b(b~p) [a . (~3In)(m-c) ' f] (9.3)
ana
~" - r-é-p-S(S'p) Ld"
i(~3~~)(m"-c") - f] (9.4)
where d~(D~C)-[D(m)~C(m)]. Hence, the main difference is that changes ín
government debt can affect non-human wealth and thus private consumption.
Steady-state asset market equilibrium yields
f(m) - ~ (~3~n2)(8-9") ~ ~ (d"-d)
and
(9.5)
r(m) - [P - ~b'(9~3") t ~ (dtd")JI(ltb') (9.6)34
whilst steady-state equilibrium in the goods market and current account
yields
e(m)' C~2~(1-~z)](B"-B) 4 ~(P'l~2)C(~1-~3)I(1-gZ)]C(~3InZ)(e"-a)td-d"].
(9.7)
c(m)--C~2~(1-~Z)J B t~(P'l~2)C~31(1-g2)][(~3~n2)(8-8") t d"-dJ (9.8)
and
cm(m) - -C~Z~(1-gZ)JB" ' ~(p'~~2)C~ll(1-~Z)]C(~3In2)(s-S")fd"-dJ (9.9)
where
d(m) - {(g2~~1)[g-c(m)J - (~3~~)8}I(v-r). (9.10)
Hence, a smaller reaction coefficient leads to a larger government debt
which pushes up interest rates t)iroughout the world and leads to an increase
in foreign debt in the long run. The direct effect is an increase in long-
run non-human wealth at home and abroad. Human wealth is cut at home as
taxes are increased when government debt is increased. This outweighs the
increase in non-human wealth, since home consumption and imports must fall
in the long run in order to generate a trade surplus to finance the extra
interest payments on foreign debt. Foreign consumption of home and of
foreign goods increase by the same amount as home consumption falls. The
result of Lhis excess demand for foreign goods is, as long as there is a35
domestic bias in consumption (yCi or ~1)g3), a depreciation of the long-run
real exchange rate.
So far, the effects of a change in long-run government debt, given
fiscal and monetary policy, have been considered. IC may be more natural to
examine the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy when government debt
is endogeneous. These results will be different from the long-run
multipliers discussed in Section 8, because the assumption of finite lives
means that taxes can be passed on to future, yet unborn generations and thus
Ricardian debt neutrality no longer holds. For example, a cut in monetary
growth leads to less seigniorage revenues and thus leads to a larger
government debt which reinforces the accumulation of foreign debt and
reinforces the upward pressure on the real interest rate. The long-run
depreciation of the real exchange rate (for y~~) and the fall in home
consumption are also reinforced. Similarly, a fiscal expansion implies a
larger government debt and thus an accumulation of foreign debt and an
increase in the real interest rate. The appreciation of the real exchange
rate is attanuate3 and the fall in home cousumption is reinforced. In
addition, imports of the home country fall.
These steady-state properties are also reflected in the simulations
reported in Tables 1 and 2. For the case of a monetary disinflation, the
long-run real exchange rate depreciates by more than twice as much as under
tax finance in order to generate a sufficiently large trade surplus to
service the additional foreign debt. Similarly, the loss in the nation's
wealth implies greater long-run falls in home consumption and increases in
foreign consumption. There is a smaller (greater) fall in the long-run home
(foreign) price level than under tax finance, which means that the nominal36
exchange rate appreciates by much less in the long run. For the case of a
fiscal expansion, the real exchange rate appreciates by much less than under
tax finance as a trade surplus has to be generated in order to service the
foreign debt that has now been accumulated. The long-run home price level
rises by much more now, which is the main reason of the depreciation oF the
long-run nominal exchange rate. The results confirm the short-run Mundell-
Fleming analysis, because on impact both a monetary disinflation and a
fiscal expansion increase foreign output and employment and therefore a
monetary expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy and a fiscal expansion
is a locomotive policy in the short run.
10. Concluding remarks
A two-country, intertemporal, perfect-foresight model with micro
foundations, Cobb-Douglas preferences and technologies, floating exchange
rates, uncovered interest parity, and nominal wage rigidities has been
formulated. Taxes adjust to mair,tain a constant stock of government debt.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the governments and private sector
have been modelled in an internally consistent manner. Nominal wage rigidity
has been incorporated in an augmented Phillips curve. When core inflation
equals monetary growth, there are no international spill-over effects so
that the multipliers for monetary growth and government spending are the
same for a small open economy as for a large open economy.37
In addition the real exchange rate adjusts to maintain continuous
equilibrium in the balance of trade, so that there is no role for current-
account dynamics. These somewhat surprising results follow from both the
home and foreign government's budget being continuously in balance, from
Ricardian debt neutrality and from both countries having the same rate of
time preference. Monetary disinflation does not lead to overshooting of the
nominal exchange rate, although it does lead to overshooting of the
inflation rate. When core inflation adapts sluggishly to increases in the
cost of living, there is the possibility of international spill-over
effects. As far as the cumulative deviation of output From its natural rate
is concerned, a monetary disinflation has no international spill-over effect
whilst a fiscal expansion is, in contrast to standard, short-run Mundell-
Fleming analysis, a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
To give a non-trivial role to wealth effects and current-account
dynamics and to allow for more interesting international spill-over effects,
the model was extended to allow for finite lifetimes so that Ricardian debt
neutrality no lcnger 4clds. Now a monetary disi~iflation has a po~ítive
(negative ) effect on the cumulative deviation of foreign output from its
natural rate, when there is a domestic (import) bias in consumption. Hence,
in line with the Mundell-Fleming analysis, a monetary expansion is a beggar-
thy-neighbour policy. Monetary disinflation now does lead to overshooting of
the real exchange rate. A comparison between tax finance and debt finance of
changes in monetary growth and government spending illustrates the
importance of allowing for the intertemporal budget constraints of private
sector agents and governments and the implied dynamics in the current
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m
S'
xTable 1: Monetary Disinflation (pq--1)
INFINITE LIVES FINITE LIVES (b - 0.02)
rt-9 n -~(p -rt) TAX FINANCE DEBT FINANCE (v- 0.075) c
Time 0 5 0 5 m 0 5 ~ 0 5 ~
xome output (y) -24 -5.36 -24 4.25 0 -20.35 3.53 ~ -19.28 3.33 0
Foreign output (y") 0 0 0 1.16 0 2.70 0.28 0 3.56 0.03 0
Home consumption (c) -32 -7.14 -32 5.67 0 -24 7.29 -6.67 -21.86 7.72 -15.88
Foreign consumption (c") 0 0 0 1.54 0 0.46 -2.21 6.67 0.90 -3.24 15.88
Home real money balances (m) 8 32.86 8 45.68 40 6.78 38.28 28.04 6.43 35.92 16.18
Foreign real money balances (m") 0 0 0 1.54 0 -0.90 -3.80 1.37 -1.19 -5.66 7.94
Home nominal interest rate (i) -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -0.77 -0.78 -0.87 -0.71 -0.70 -0.80
Foreign nominal interest rate (i") 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.20
Home real interest rate (r) 9.60 2.14 17.12 1.31 0 15.44 1.14 0.13 14.93 1.04 0.20
Foreign real interest rate (r") 0 0 -5.12 0.96 0 -6.57 0.85 0.13 -7.02 0.77 0.20
Home inflation (p ) -6.76 -2.29 -9.23 -2.17 -1 -7.41 -1.80 -1 -6.86 -1.64 -1
Foreign inflationc(p") -3.84 -0.86 -3.78 -1.10 0 -2.20 -0.92 0 -1.71 -0.82 0
Home core inflation c(rt) -1 -1 -10.40 -4.76 -1 -9.85 -3.92 -1 -9.69 -3.63 -1
Foreign core inflation (rt") 0 0 6.40 -1.78 0 6.91 -1.13 0 7.07 -0.89 0
Real exchange rate (e) -32 -7.14 -32 4.13 0 -32.31 3.04 3-33 -32.39 2.76 7.94
Nominal exchange rate -40 -40 -40 -40 -40 -40 -39.05 -23-34 -40 -38.81 -0.29
Net foreign assets (f) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -11.46 -200 0 -14.27 -476.47
Home government debt (d) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46.49 367.47
Foreign government debt (d") 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.76 -176.47
Home human wealth (H~C) -40 -40 -40 -40 -40 -30.77 -19.54 165.30 -28.29 -60.42 76.94
Foreign human wealth (HM~C") 0 0 0 0 0 i.36 -9.87 -194.70 2.09 -21.61 -292.06
Parameters: a- 0.375. a' - 1.5, ~- 0.75. S' - 3. n' p- 0.025. ~1 - 0.45, ~2 - 0.3. ~3 - 0.25, ~- 0.4,
~1 - 0.45. g2 - 0.25, ~3 - 0.3.Table 2: Fiscal Expansion (~g-1)
INFINITE LIVES AND n-8 FINITE LIVES (b - 0.02) AND R -}(pc-R)
TAX FINANCE ' DEBT FINANCE (U - 0.075)
Time 0 5 ~ 0 5 m 0 5 m
Home output (y) 0.20 0.04 0 0.20 -0.01 0 0.28 -0.02 0
Foreign output (y') 0 -0.04 0 0 -0.04 0 0.06 -0.06 0
Home consumption (c) -0.07 -0.27 -0.33 -0.07 -0.35 -0.33 0.09 -0.31 -0.73
Foreign consumption (c') 0 0 0 0 -0.05 0 0.03 -0.14 0.39
Home real money balances (m) -0.07 -0.27 -0.33 -0.07 -0.35 -0.33 -0.09 -0.52 -0.92
Foreign real money balances (m") 0 0 0 0 -0.05 0 -0.02 -0.19 0.20
Home nominal interest rate (i) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0
Foreign nominal interest rate (i") 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Home real interest rate (r) -0.08 -0.02 0 -0.10 -0.02 0 -0.13 -0.03 0
Foreign real interest rate (r`) 0 0 0 -0.01 0 0 -0.04 -0.01 0
Home inflation (p ) 0.05 0.01 0 0.06 0.01 0 0.10 0.02 0
Foreign inflationc(p') 0.03 0.01 0 0.05 0.01 0 0.08 0.01 0
c Home core inflation (rt) o 0 0 0.02 0.03 0 0.03 0.05 0
Foreign core inflation (R") 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0
Real exchange rate (e) -0.07 -0.27 -0.33 -0.07 -0.29 -0.33 -0.07 -0.31 -0.14
Nominal exchenge rate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.98
Net foreign assets (f) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.23 -11.76
Home government debt (d) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.85 19.17
Foreign government debt (d") 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 -4.36
Home human wealth (H~C) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 -2.41 -7.21
Foreign human wealth (H'iC') 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 -0.37 -7.21
Parameters: a- 0-375, a' - 1.5, s- 0.75, p' - 3, n- p- 0.025, yl - 0.45, y2 - 0.3, y3 - 0.25, y- 0.4,
ql - 0.45, g2 - 0.25. ~3 - 0.3.
' This yields the same outcome irrespective of whether expected lifetimes are finite or infinite.Discussion Paper Series, CentElt, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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